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THE EXECUTIVE PARDON OF BARAK SOPE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VANUATU
Patrick Keyzer*
Before his recent appointment to the position of Foreign Minister of the Republic of
Vanuatu, Barak Sope was convicted for forgery and received an executive pardon (he
was later re-elected), The Vanuatu Court of Appeal held that the pardon only had
prospective effect, and so he was not entitled to resume his seat in the Parliament,
Further consideration of the Barak Sope case provides an opportunity to reflect on the
principles and techniques of statutory and constitutional construction applied in
Vanuatu. The author concludes that consistent standards relating to questions of
construction in this context are difficult to locate and steps may need to be taken to
advance research and scholarship to harmonize the common law applied in the courts
with local customs and traditions.
1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to describe and analyse the decision of the Vanuatu
Court of Appeal regarding the legal effect of a presidential pardon given to Mr
Barak Mauutamate Sope, currently the Foreign Minister, but formerly the Prime
Minister of the Republic of Vanuatu.' Last year the Vanuatu Court of Appeal
held that even though Mr Sope received a full presidential pardon, this did not
restore Mr Sope to his full civil rights.? I argue that this result is somewhat
surprising in light of the support for Mr Sope's position in the United States
jurisprudence of executive pardons. But much more importantly, the alternative
conclusion that the executive pardon ought to have operated from the moment
of conviction, rather than simply prospectively from the date of grant, is
strongly reinforced when the language of the pardon that was granted and the
language of the Vanuatu Constitution describing the executive power to pardon,
is taken into account. The language of both documents should have tipped the
scales in Mr Sope's favour.
Some further consideration of Sope Mauutamate v Speaker of Parliament'
('Barak Sope') provides an opportunity to reflect on the principles and
techniques of statutory and constitutional construction applied in Vanuatu. In
Attorney-General v The President of Yanuatu.: Sir Harry Gibbs! held that the
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Technology, Sydney and sometime Barrister of
the Supreme Court of the Republic of Vanuatu. The author was junior counsel for Mr Sope
in the Court of Appeal of Vanuatu in the case which is the subject of this article.
I Sope Mauutamate v Speaker of Parliament (Unreported, Court of Appeal of Vanuatu,
Robertson, Von Doussa, Fatiaki, and Saksak JJ, 9 May 2003).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Vanuatu, Gibbs J, I January 1994).
5 Formerly Chief Justice of Australia.
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Vanuatu Constitution was sui generis: the product of the work of a local
Constitutional Committee and should be construed in accordance with its
terms." To what extent was that principle honoured in this case? Is it possible
to locate consistent guidance on questions of constitutional construction in
Vanuatu that might make adherence to this principle possible? This article seeks
to answer those questions.
2 BACKGROUND
In July 2002 Mr Sope was charged and convicted of two counts of forgery
relating to documents providing government guarantees of $SM and $18M US
payable to a Vanuatu Investment Corporation Limited." The Supreme COUlt
found that the documents had fictitious identifying numbers and that Mr Sope
had produced the documents with dishonest intent, reflected in a failure to
comply with proper procedures mandated by public finance legislation. Justice
Coventry of the Supreme COUltsentenced Mr Sope to three years on each count;
sentences to be served concurrently. In sentencing, His Lordship noted the
presence of the Vanuatu Members of Parliament (Vacation of Seats) Act, which,
it was suggested, would disqualify him from continuing to sit in Parliament if he
were convicted. Section 3( I) of the Members of Parliament (Vacation of Seats)
Act8 provides that:
If a member of Parliament is convicted of an offence and is sentenced by a court
to imprisonment for a term of not less than two (2) years, he shall forthwith cease
to perform his functions as a member of Parliament and his seat shall become
vacant at the expiration of thirty days thereafter.
Mr Sope fell ill while he was in prison and he sought a presidential pardon.?
After ceremonies consistent with indigenous traditions, the President, Father
John Bennett Bani, gave Mr Sope a presidential pardon on 13 November 2002,
expressed in the following terms:
PARDON
WHEREAS Article 38 of the Constitution provides inter alia, for the President of
the Republic of Vanuatu to Pardon a person convicted of an offence;
AND WHEREAS BARAK TAME SOPE was convicted and found guilty of
certain offences by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Vanuatu on 19 July,
2002 and sentenced to three years imprisonment.
6 Ex parte Garland 71 US (4 Wall) 333, 380 (1866). See also Boyd v United States 142 US
450,453-454 (1892).
7 Public Prosecutor v Sope Mauutamate (Unreported, Supreme Court of Vanuatu, Coventry
J, 19 July 2002).
8 Cap 174.
9 See Kathleen Dean Moore. Pardons: Justice. Mercy and the Public Interest (1989) 5. for
the various justifications for granting an executive pardon, including illness.
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AND WHEREAS I am of the opinion that the continued imprisonment of
BARAKTAME SOPEmay be injurious to his health;
In the exercise of the power conferred on me by Article 38 of the Constitution I,
FATHER JOHN BENNETT BANI, President of the Republic of Vanuatu,
HEREBY PARDON BARAK TAME SOPE of the offences for which he was
convicted in the Supremeon 19July 2002.
MADE at the StateOffice this 13th day of November, 2002
......................................................
FATHER JOHNBENNETTBANI
President of the Republic of Vanuatu
Following his pardon, Mr Sope sought to be reinstated to his parliamentary seat
on the footing that he had been exonerated. However the Speaker of the
Parliament of Vanuatu refused to recognize that Mr Sope had been exonerated
by his pardon and steps were taken toward the holding of a by-election for Mr
Sope's seat in Parliament. As a result, Mr Sope commenced proceedings in the
Supreme Court of Vanuatu seeking declarations and other orders in relation to
his entitlement to continue to sit in Parliament.
At first instance, Chief Justice Vincent Lunabek rejected Mr Sope's claims,
holding that Article 38 of the Constitution of Vanuatu had a limited meaning:
while it might exonerate Mr Sope for the conviction, it did not relieve him of the
consequences of the conviction, and the operation of the Members of Parliament
(Vacation of Seats) ActIO. In particular, Lunabek CJ relied on English authority
to the effect that a pardon could not quash a conviction. I 1 His Honour in effect
reasoned that as 'only the Courts on an appellate level can quash a conviction', a
pardon did not eliminate the effect of the Members of Parliament (Vacation of
Seats) Act which provided that a Member of Parliament's seat should be vacated
on a Member being convicted of a crime and sentenced to a specified term of
imprisonment.
3 THE ARGUMENTSON APPEAL
On appeal to the Vanuatu Court of Appeal, Senior Counsel'? for Mr Sope
developed four interrelated arguments. First, Sope argued that Lunabek CJ had
conflated treatment of the judicial power to quash convictions with the
executive power to pardon convictions. It was conceded that the executive
government could not quash a conviction; that this was a power that can only be
properly exercised by an appeal court. The power to 'quash' is judicial in
nature. However it was argued that a full pardon can remove the effect of a
conviction. It does this, not by quashing the conviction, but by restoring the
10 Cap 174.
II R v FOSler (1984) 2 All ER 679.
11 Stephen Southwood QC.
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person who is the subject of the pardon to the position they would have been in
if the conviction had not taken place.
Secondly it was argued that the Chief Justice had erred in concluding that the
presidential pardon could only have prospective effect. The scope and effect of a
pardon falls to be determined by the intention of the grantor when he or she
exercises this power.P The operative part of the pardon referred to 19 July
2002, the date of the appellant's conviction and sentence, unambiguously
indicating that the pardon was effective from that date.!" It was contended that
the terms of the presidential pardon in this case were wide enough to conclude
that Mr Sope had received an absolute and unconditional pardon, and the
reference to the date of the conviction made it clear that the pardon was
intended to operate from and including that date.P As to the intentions of the
President in granting the pardon, it was contended that the Chief Justice ought to
have had regard to the fact that the pardon was granted by the President after he
received representations from the Chiefs and Elders of Vanuatu at ceremonies
held in accordance with Vanuatu customs and traditions (I return to consider the
significance of local traditions to constitutional construction in the conclusion).
The third argument was based on the structure of the Vanuatu Constitution and
the text of Article 38. It was argued that a proper approach to the construction of .
the presidential power of pardon required the Court of Appeal to have regard to
the separation of powers ordained by the Vanuatu Constitution: due respect
ought be accorded by the judiciary to the exercise of executive powers, along
similar lines to the approach taken in the United States. 16The text of Article 38
of the Constitution o/the Republic of Yanuatu provides as follows:
13 Kelleher v Parole Board of New South Wales (1984) 156 CLR 364; Re Royal Prerogative
of Mercy Upon Deportation Proceedings (1933) 2 DLR 348, 349-350.
14 This argument was specifically rejected by the Court of Appeal for reasons discussed
below.
15 '[A]lthough the power of the President of Vanuatu to grant a pardon is entirely derived
from the constitution, the power is one that corresponds to the power of the English Crown,
so that English decisions may be assistance': Attorney-General v The President of Yanuatu
(Unreported, Supreme Court of Vanuatu, Gibbs J, 19 July 2002). Counsel for Mr Sope
argued that the words 'corresponds to' in this quotation ought be read as 'analogous to'
though not necessarily' in conformity with'.
16 Previous authority con tinned that the nature of the powers and position of the President of
Vanuatu can be determined only 'by a consideration of the Constitution itself: Attorney-
General v The President of vanuatu (Unreported, Supreme Court of Vanuatu. Gibbs J, I
January 1994).
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PRESIDENTIAL POWERS OF PARDON, COMMUTATION AND
REDUCTION OF SENTENCES
The President of the Republic may pardon, commute or reduce a sentence
imposed on a person convicted of an offence. Parliament may provide for a
committee to advise the President in the exercise of this function.
This provision yielded the same result whether a literal approach or a purposive
approach was taken. The ordinary grammatical meaning of the provision is that
the President has the power to: pardon a person convicted of an offence;
commute a sentence imposed on a person convicted of an offence; or reduce a
sentence imposed on a person convicted of an offence.!? The power is perfectly
general, and apt to enable the President to order a full pardon or a conditional
pardon at any point in time. Furthermore, the President's power of pardon is not
confined to the pardoning of 'a sentence imposed on a person'. Such a
construction would give the word 'pardon' no work to do. It would effectively
mean that the President merely had the power to commute or reduce a sentence.
The heading indicates that the Article itself is intended to deal with the topic of
three discrete presidential powers: pardon, commutation and reduction of
sentences. Emphasis should also be given to the grammar and punctuation of the
Article in context. The natural and ordinary meaning of the sentence is that the
President has the power to pardon (pause), the power to commute and (or)
reduce a sentence. To the extent that there is any ambiguity, the heading to
Article 38 ought to be used to determine the scope of the Article and to resolve
ambiguity. IX
The purpose of Article 38, set out in the heading, was to grant the President in
full the prerogative of mercy. At common law a pardon could be free or
conditional. In R v Milnes and Greent" Cox J said:
A pardon ... at common law is the solemn act by which the Sovereign, either
absolutely or conditionally, forgives or remits for the benefit of the person to
whom it is granted the legal consequences of a crime he has committed.
The breadth of the prerogative power was noted in Re Royal Prerogative of
Mercy Upon Deportation Proceedings'? when the Supreme Court of Canada
17 The language of Article 3R should be given its natural and ordinary meaning. The words of
the Constitution should be construed with all the generality that the words admit. informed
by the cultural traditions of Vanuatu and applying English analogies where this is
appropriate: Sope I' Attorney General No 2 [19RO-1994] Van LR 363.
IX See R I' Surrey Assessment Committee [194R] I KB 29. 32; Silk Bms Ply Ltd \' State
Electricitv Commission of Yictoria ( 1943) 57 CLR I; K & SLake cu, Freighters Ply Ltd I'
Gordon & Gotch Ltd (191\5) 60 ALR 509. 511-512 (resolving scope); Hammersmith
Railway" Brand (11;69) LR 4 HL 171; Sanderson" Fotheringham (IXXS) 11 VLR 190;
Police vCarpenter [1975] 2 NZLR 621. 625-626 (resolving ambiguity).
III (191;3) 33 Si\SR 211.
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cited Dicey's description of the prerogative as being 'both historically and as a
matter of actual fact nothing else than the residue of discretionary or arbitrary
authority, which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown',
Australian authority also accords with this perspective on the prerogative." The
'legal consequences of a crime' include arrest, charge, trial, conviction and
punishment. Traditionally, the power to pardon could be granted either before or
after attainder or conviction.F Given the wide variety of reasons for which a
pardon can be granted, this is not surprising. A pardon could leave a judgment
formally unreversed and, presumably, it may formally reverse the judgment.P
In Cuddington v Wilkes,24 the Kings Bench said that the 'King's pardon doth not
only clear the offence itself, but all the dependencies, penalties, and disabilities
incident unto it'. To like effect, the American cases emphasised that when a
pardon is full it 'blots out of existence the guilt' and restores the former convict
'to all his civil rights, it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity'c-> As Professor Williston remarked:
if the mere conviction involves certain disqualifications which would not follow
from the mere commission of the crime without conviction, the pardon removes
such disqualificarions.P
Counsel for Mr Sope relied on Cuddington v Wilkes and the US authorities to
argue that the presidential pardon granted by Father Bani in accordance with
local traditions had blotted out Mr Sope's guilt, and accordingly, he was entitled
to resume his seat in Parliament. A by-election had not been held and Mr Sope
had always contended that he had not forfeited his seat.
The final argument was that to the extent that the Members of Parliament
(Vacation of Seats) Act27 was relied on to remove Mr Sope from his seat, it was
repugnant to the Vanuatu Constitution. Article 38 of the Constitution is not in
20 (1933) 2 DLR 348, 351. See also Kelleher v Parole Board of New South Wales (1984) 156
CLR 364.
21 In the colony of New South Wales pardons were described as omnipotent: R v Farrell
(Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Dowling and Stephen 11. 30 July 1831).
General pardons were distinguished from conditional pardons R v Raine (Unreported,
Supreme Court of New South Wales, Forbes CJ, 9 December 1828).
22 Alpheus Todd, Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies (2nd ed, 1894) 359; cited
with approval by Ambrose J in Sharples v Amison [2002] 2 Qd R 444.
23 Kelleher v Parole Board of New South Wales (1984) 156 CLR 364.
24 (1614)80ER231,232.
25 Attorney-General v The President of Vanuatu (Unreported, Supreme Court of Vanuatu,
Gibbs J, 19 July 2002).
26 Samuel Williston, 'Does A Pardon Blot Out Guilt?' (1915) 28 Harvard Law Review 647,
653. See also Sidney Buchanan, 'The Nature of a Pardon under the United States
Constitution' (1978) 39 Ohio State Law Journal 36; 'Presidential Pardons and the Common
Law' (1975) 53 North Carolina Law Review 785.
27 Cap 174.
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terms expressed to be subject to the other provisions of the Constitution. Unlike
other constitutions such as the Australian Constitution, the Constitution of the
Republic of Vanuatu does not provide for the vacation of a member's seat in
Parliament when a Member of Parliament is convicted of a serious criminal
offence. Therefore, subject to what is stated below, once elected to Parliament
Mr Sope had a right to remain a Member until the expiration of the
Parliamentary term, Rather than provide expressly for the vacation of a Member
of Parliament's seat when a Member has been convicted of a serious criminal
offence, Chapter 10 of the Constitution establishes a Leadership Code for the
conduct of leaders including a Member of Parliament and Article 68 states:
'Parliament shall by law give effect to the principles of this Chapter'. It was
therefore arguable that Article 68 enables the Parliament to legislate for the
disqualification of members of Parliament if they breach of the Code of Conduct
and to stipulate what amounts to a breach of the Code of Conduct. However,
the power granted to Parliament pursuant to either Article 68 or Article 16 was
not such as to enable Parliament to ovenide the other provisions of the
Constitution. In the circumstances, the failure of Parliament to provide in the
Members of Parliament (Vacation of Seats) Act for a Member of Parliament to
receive the benefit of a pardon was therefore inconsistent with Article 38 of the
Constitution.
4 THE JUDGMENTOF THE COURTOF APPEAL
All the arguments set out above were rejected by the Court of Appeal. The final
argument was rejected on jurisdictional grounds that are not presently relevant.
As to the arguments relating to the effect of the pardon, the Court held that the
effect of Mr Sope's conviction was to trigger the operation of the Members of
Parliament (Vacation of Seats) Act,28 and that he was disentitled to resume that
seat. The Court characterized Mr Sope's argument as one that was based on the
proposition that the executive pardon was argued to operate retrospectively.
That is. the Court did not give emphasis to the plain language of the pardon,
which was expressed to operate from the date of conviction, or to the relevant
article of the Constitution, which clearly authorizes unconditional pardons.
Rather, the Court emphasized dicta in the US cases to the effect that a person
who had forfeited their rights and entitlements consequent upon a conviction
could not automatically resume those entitlements upon receipt of a pardon.
This exception to the general rule that a pardon restores a person to their full
civil rights is justified in circumstances where a third party has, through no fault
of their own, assumed a right or entitlement that was formerly enjoyed by the
(former) convict. The exception operates to protect a person in the equivalent
position to a person who has acquired property on a bona fide basis for value
28 Cap 174.
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without notice. The Court of Appeal quoted the following passage, placing the
emphasis on the italicized words-?
A pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is released from the
consequences of his offense, so far as such release is practicable and within
control of the pardoning power, or of officers under its direction. It releases the
offender from all disabilities imposed by the offense, and restores him to his full
civil rights.
While the Court of Appeal emphasized the italicized words, the applicant drew
attention to the entire passage of the judgment of the US Supreme Court.
While the exception referred to above may have a perfectly sensible policy
rationale, it is certainly arguable that it should not have been applied to Mr
Sope. The policy rationale for the exception to the rule was inapplicable in Mr
Sope's case because there had been no by-election for Mr Sope's seat at the
time he made his application to the Court to be reinstated. Nor had there been a
by-election by the time the appeal was argued in the Court of Appeal. Since no
one else could claim to hold Mr Sope's seat in Parliament (indeed for part of the
period of his incarceration he was being paid), and he had consistently
maintained his right to that seat, the restoration of his civil rights was, indeed,
practicable.
Once Mr Sope was absolutely pardoned, in terms that were expressed to operate
from the date of conviction, the text of Article 38 should have been given its full
effect and the dicta in the United States cases had to be approached with due
circumspection. Whatever the consequences of the decision in practical terms,
due weight needed to be given to the intentions clearly expressed in the pardon
by the executive government of Vanuatu.
5 FURTHERANALYSIS ANDCONCLUSIONS
The legal questions in this case were difficult and important, and as noted
above'? there is room for differences of opinion and differences of emphasis in
the analysis of the jurisprudence of executive pardons. Nevertheless the
development of a consistent constitutional jurisprudence in Vanuatu and
adherence to the Chief Justice Gibbs' principle noted at the outset of this paper
29 See Knote v United States 95 US l49, 154 (l877). The Court of Appeal quoted this
passage, placing the emphasis on the italicized words: 'A pardon is an act of grace by
which an offender is released from the consequences of his offense, so far as such release is
practicable and within control of the pardoning power, or of officers under its direction. It
releases the offender from all disabilities imposed by the offense, and restores him to his
full civil rights'. While the Court of Appeal emphasized the italicized words, the applicant
drew attention to the entire passage of the judgment of the US Supreme Court.
30 Williston, above n 26; Buchanan, above n 30.
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presents significant challenges to courts and to counsel representing clients in
constitutional cases.
First, reference to diverse sources of law create additional complicating factors
in circumstances where a local provision relating to an executive power is under
consideration, viz, should the UK or the US cases on executive pardons have
been applied? Was the emphasis on a particular aspect of the US decisions
warranted in a context where the language of the Vanuatu Constitution pointed
in another direction?
Secondly, Barak Sope involved the exercise of the executive power of
presidential pardon. That power confers one of the widest possible discretions,
It is a power that is characterized by its exercise for reasons that are often
controversial (even in the United States), but always local. In this case, Mr
Sope was pardoned for ill health after ceremonies involving representations by
the Council of Chiefs.
For these reasons, when the COUIt of Appeal declined to give effect to this
pardon it took a very significant step. Did the COUItshow the proper degree of
deference to the executive branch, ie., not just the proper measure of respect for
the separate power exercised by the executive branch of government, but also
the proper measure of respect for local traditions? As noted at the beginning of
this paper, in Attorney-General v The President of Vanuatu, Sir Harry Gibbs, a
former Chief Justice of Australia, held that the Vanuatu Constitution was sui
generis: the product of the work of a local Constitutional Committee and should
be construed in accordance with its terms." This principle does not appear to
have been applied in this case.
In conclusion, the Gibbs' principle pays the proper degree of deference to local
customs and traditions. Having said that, the courts and the counsel who work
in them cannot take steps to ensure that local customs and traditions are given
due weight unless information relating to these traditions is made available. To
that end, there is a strong case for further research to be conducted to determine
the extent to which local circumstances may be used to inform questions of
constitutional construction in the future. Scholarship that attempts to harmonize
and synthesize Vanuatu customs and traditions with the common law applied in
courts is necessary. Such efforts are quite likely to improve cross-cultural legal
and constitutional understandings in the longer term.
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FOREWORD FROM THE PRESIDENT, LAWASIA
Dear Friends,
LAWASIA Journal 200312004 is the result of hard and intensive work by its
editorial board under the able guidance of Dr Jennifer Corrin Care of The
University of Queensland's TC Beirne School of Law. Extensive legal literature
contained in this journal will, I am sure, serve as a useful legal tool and will be a
source of required information and enlightenment.
LAW ASIA was established in Canberra, Australia in 1966. Originally, it was
composed of representatives from Bar Associations of only 18 countries but has by
now acquired much larger numbers of Bar Associations, Law Societies and
individual lawyers from the entire Asia-Pacific region. Its activities substantially
contribute in the development of diverse branches of law including business law,
energy law, arbitration law etc. However, what is most important is that
LAWASIA concentrates on the rule of law and human rights.
The objectives of LAWASIA are reproduced in this journal and include:
• The desire to advance the standard of legal education
• To further the diffusion of knowledge of the law
• To promote the development of law
• To advance the science of jurisprudence
The inclusion of Section Reports and Country Notes will assist members of the
legal profession, the judiciary, legal academics, administrators, and students to stay
informed of current and relevant matters of interest throughout this rapidly
changing region.
In closing, readers are reminded that each edition of the LAWASIA Journal is
enhanced by the desire of its contributors to share knowledge and research in a
truly egalitarian manner. LAWASIA members are encouraged to consider
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